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Abstract
The recent explosion of the informal venture capital is stimulating finance 
scholars to deeply investigate the major determinants, characteristics and 
possible implications of this phenomenon within the start-up ecosystems. 
The rising literature on business angels (BAs) still misses to adequately 
cover many investigation areas, such as the operations and the role played 
by the different typologies of BA networks (BANs) and the valuation of 
the contributions provided by BAs to the performance of the angel-backed 
companies. The contributions of Bonini et al. (2018, 2019) are part of 
the ongoing debate on these two research areas that have not yet been 
exhaustively explored. The two papers show that the affiliation to an angel 
community affects BAs’ investment decisions, though it doesn’t seem to 
have a significant impact on the survival and profitability of the funded 
ventures. On the contrary, by co-investing in an angel syndicate, BAs may 
enjoy risk- and information-sharing benefits that structurally affect both 
their investment practices and the performance of the funded ventures. 
Also, the BAs’ willingness to play an active role does have a positive impact 
on angel-backed companies’ survival and growth. Finally, the intensity of 
BAs’ soft monitoring seems negatively related to the performance of the 
funded ventures because of the impact on the trust-based entrepreneur–
angel relationship. However, angel communities might be able to decrease 
and distribute within the network the need for individual monitoring while 
increasing members’ confidence in the angel investments.
1.  Introduction
The growing relevance of the role played by business angels (BAs) within 
the entrepreneurial finance eco-system emerges unambiguously by look-
ing at market data at both the US and the European level (US ACA, 2016; 
Kraemer-Eis et al., 2016; OECD, 2016; EBAN, 2017; Invest Europe, 2017).
BAs are: high net worth individuals who invest their own money in 
small unlisted companies, with no family connections, typically assuming a 
minority equity stake as well as active involvement in portfolio companies 
(Mason, 2008). Thanks to their growth as well as increasing professional-
ization angel investors have filled the so-called “funding gap” existing 
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between the demand and supply of early-stage equity capital, thus becom-
ing crucial drivers of entrepreneurship and economic growth (Mason and 
Harrison, 2000; Johnson and Sohl, 2012; Mason et al., 2013; Capizzi, 2015; 
Bonini and Capizzi, 2017). As a matter of fact, from the one hand, BAs 
meet a demand for an equity ticket size (on average between 100k and 
300k euros) usually neglected by venture capitalists because of the rela-
tively high costs required for due diligence, contracting and monitoring 
(Gompers, 1995; Jeng and Wells, 2000; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; 
Carpenter and Peterson, 2002; Mason, 2009; Cumming and Johan, 2013; 
Bernstein et al., 2016). From the other hand, BAs, alongside with mone-
tary resources, provide non-monetary resources, such as industrial knowl-
edge, management experience, mentoring and personal relationship 
networks (Harrison and Mason, 1992; Landström, 1993; Politis, 2008).
The growing relevance of this informal segment of the equity capital 
markets gave rise to the development on a worldwide basis of a vast litera-
ture focused on business angels, adopting various theoretical perspectives, 
research scopes and methodologies (Landstrom and Mason, 2016; 
Edelman et al., 2017; Tenca et al., 2018). Relying on a well-accepted clas-
sification approach based on research themes, we can identify at least five 
focused streams of contributions, summarized in the following.
The first research theme examines the main features of both BAs and 
their investment decision-making process (Mason and Harrison, 2000; 
Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Shane, 2000; Paul et al., 2007; Sudek et al., 2008; 
Wiltbank et al., 2009; Macht, 2011; Bammens and Collewaert, 2014; 
Harrison and Mason, 2017; Bonini et al., 2018).
The second group comprises studies focusing on the comparison 
between the operations and the investment practices of angel investors and 
venture capitalists (VCs), trying also to investigate the nature of the rela-
tionship between BAs and VCs (Van Osnabrugge, 1998; Harrison and 
Mason, 2000; Madill et al., 2005; Sohl, 2006; Ibrahim, 2008; Wong et al., 
2009; Johnson and Sohl, 2012; Vanacker et al., 2013; Chemmanur and 
Chen, 2014; Hsu et al., 2014; Kerr et al., 2014; Hellmann et al., 2017).
The third stream of contributions addresses the issue of the transfor-
mation of the angel market taking place after the rising of angel investment 
organizations (business angel networks (BANs), angel clubs or syndicates), 
identifying the major monetary and non-monetary contributions provided 
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to either the entrepreneurs of the BA joining a given group of angels 
(Mason and Harrison, 1997; Mason, 2008; Paul and Whittam, 2010; 
Collewaert et al., 2010; Brush et al., 2012; Mason et al., 2013; Carpentier 
and Suret, 2015; Lahti and Keinonen, 2016; Croce et al., 2017; Gregson 
et al., 2017; Bonini et al., 2019).
The fourth research topic deals with the identification and the mea-
surement of the determinants of the profitability of BAs’ investments 
(Lumme, 1996; Harrison and Mason, 1999; Mason and Harrison, 2002; 
Wiltbank, 2005; Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007; Werth and Boeert, 2013; De 
Gennaro and Dwyer, 2014; Capizzi, 2015; Politis, 2016).
The final group of studies, leveraging on the literature on venture capi-
tal and private equity (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Davila et al., 2003; 
Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Hsu, 2006; Søresen, 2007; Colombo and 
Grilli, 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014) focuses on the analysis of the performance of the angel-
backed companies, disentangling also the impact of the different typolo-
gies of value-added contribution on the success of the funded ventures 
(Manigart et al., 2002; Harrison and Mason, 2008; Pommet, 2012; 
Alemany and Villanueva, 2015; Lerner et al., 2016; Levratto et al., 2017; 
Cumming and Zhang, 2018; Bonini et al., 2019).
Despite the notable flourishment of research on angel financing, how-
ever, what we do know about the behavior, operations and performance of 
BAs and angel investment organizations is still limited and hard to gener-
alize, mostly because of the intrinsic limitations of either the anecdotal-
based evidence or the survey-based empirical analysis so far performed to 
shed light over so opaque an asset class.
In this chapter, we aim at pointing out the major findings dealing with 
some BA-specific investment practices, as emerging from two recent 
related studies providing some original and incremental contributions to 
existing literature.
The two papers focus, respectively, on the supply (Bonini et al., 2018) 
and the demand (Bonini et al., 2019) for angel financing in the early stage 
segment of the Italian capital market sharing as a starting point for the 
build-up of the datasets a common information base: the annual survey 
of the Italian Business Angel Network (IBAN) delivered since 2007 to its 
associates and other unaffiliated BAs, which provides valuable qualitative 
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and quantitative information on the companies invested, the characteris-
tics of the deals and the investment practices of the surveyed angels.
The first paper moves, among the others, from the previous contribu-
tions of Shane (2000), Sohl (2007), Paul and Whittam (2010), Mason et al. 
(2013), Mason and Botelho (2016) and Croce et al. (2017). These studies 
reveal the importance of the role played by angel groups, from the one 
hand, in collecting, processing, filtering, and disclosing information 
among members about possible investment opportunities and, from the 
other hand, in sharing within the group angels’ previous experience as well 
as competences and relational networks. In the first paper, the authors aim 
at investigating the existing relationship between the membership in a 
BAN and the investment decisions of the BAN members, as measured by 
the share of angel personal wealth invested in a given deal or the amount 
of equity stakes in the portfolio companies.
The second paper focuses on the angel-backed companies, showing 
the impact on the performance and the probability of survival of the 
funded ventures played by some angel-specific factors, among which the 
presence of angel syndicates. One critical methodological issue underlying 
such a research goal is the selection of an accurate measure for the perfor-
mance of the invested companies, given it’s hard to adopt the same metrics 
developed in the literature investigating the impact of private equity and 
VC investors on the performance of portfolio companies (Bran and 
Gompers, 1997; Black and Gilson, 1998; Hellmann and Puri, 2000; 
Kortum and Lerner, 2001; Engel, 2002; Manigart et al., 2002; Davila et al., 
2003; Bertoni et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013; 
Cumming and Johan, 2013; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014).
Different from venture-backed companies, angel-backed firms are 
mostly pre-revenues, not yet able to produce a constant stream of future 
cash flows. In many cases, they are not fully active and running their busi-
ness, up to the point that for most of them it’s concrete the case they shut 
down without having generated any sale or having capitalized significant 
assets. Therefore, in the earliest stages of their life-cycle, accounting mea-
sures of performance (turnover or its growth, ebitda, market share, return 
on equity and capital assets) are likely to have a low informative power 
about a company’s future survival and growth. Similarly, other commonly-
used metrics in the literature on venture capital such as innovation, patent 
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licensing, employment growth, productivity or successful exits through 
IPOs or acquisitions can hardly be applied in the context of angel financ-
ing, where the funded ventures quite often operate in traditional low tech 
industries, do not show accelerated growth paths in limited time frames 
nor are ready to be listed in officially regulated capital markets. Therefore, 
in order to address the limitations of the above-mentioned metrics, Bonini 
et al. (2019) propose an original proxy (the Performance Index, P.I.) for the 
survival and growth of the angel-backed companies that, as explained in 
the following section, is an ordinal variable that can assume five different 
values, based on different combinations of revenues, assets and income 
reported for the sample companies.
The major finding empirically confirmed from both contributions 
points out the crucial role played by angel syndicates in both sides of the 
investigated informal venture capital market: from the supply side, angel 
investors affiliating to an angel investment organization show a higher 
propensity to invest in a given deal when compared to unaffiliated 
angels; from the demand side, angel syndicates are a major determinant 
of the performance and the probability of survival of angel-backed 
companies.
2.  Unit of Analysis, Sample Data and Dependent Variables
The IBAN administered 3,000 questionnaires to 929 affiliates and 2071 
non-affiliates from 2009 (2008 investment data) through 2015 (2014 
investment data), with an overall response rate of 41.7% (47.2% for the 
sub-sample of affiliated angels and 39.2% for the non-affiliated angels). 
Each survey — resembling the typical structure of the questionnaires 
delivered on an annual basis by the national federations of BAs and BANs 
all over the world — enquired about investments in the previous year.
The first paper by Bonini et al. (2018) assumes as unit of analysis the 
investments made by Italian angel investors in the 2008–2014 time period, 
as shown in Table 1, Panel A.
After discarding incomplete or inconsistent filled IBAN question-
naires, the authors were able to build a final dataset based on 439 responses 
reporting an aggregate of 810 deals, for 619 unique companies, by 330 
unique investors. Such sample was used to investigate the impact of a 
b3560_Ch02.indd   18 21-08-2019   17:55:01
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preselected set of factors related to BAs’ investment practices on the angels’ 
propensity to invest part of their wealth in a given deal. Two variables have 
been used as a measure of the BAs’ investment decisions: the amount of 
capital invested as a share of the individual BA’s personal wealth 
(Y1 = Wealth%) and the amount of capital invested by an individual BA 
expressed as a share of the equity capital of the funded venture 
(Y2 = Participation%).
Table 3, Panels A and B, provides descriptive statistics related to the 
two dependent variables: the average BA allocate about the 15.5% (median 
14%) of his wealth in a given deal, which results in the acquisition of a 
minority equity-stake of about the 14.7% (median 8%) of the common 
equity of the investee company. Interesting to note, the number of obser-
vations for variable Wealth% (669) is considerably lower than for the vari-
able Participation% (808); this is due to the lower number of surveyed 
angels who have answered the specific question asking for a disclosure 
about an angel’s personal wealth, confirming one relevant and intrinsic 
selection bias affecting all the empirical analyses dealing with survey-
based questionnaires.
Table 1:  Sampling procedure.
PANEL A — Paper#l: The determinants of BAs investment decisions
Surveys sent 
(2008–2014)
Final filled 
surveys selected
No. of deals 
reported
Full Sample 3,000 439
(14.6%)
810
BAN Members 929 246
(26.5%)
438
Non-BAN Members 2,071 193
(9.3%)
372
PANEL B — Paper#2: The performance of angel-backed companies
No. of deals reported 
(2008–2012) 
(1)
No. of fully 
identified deals 
(2)
Panel firms 
(3) (3)/(2)
695 302 111 37%
b3560_Ch02.indd   19 21-08-2019   17:55:01
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The second paper by Bonini et al. (2019) bases its analysis on a sample 
of 111 companies invested by the surveyed angels in the period 
2008–2012. During those years, 695 deals were reported by IBAN respon-
dents, but full information on the names of the target companies was only 
reported for 302 deals. The 111 companies were the target of those deals 
Table 1, panel B. The companies were monitored along a time horizon of 
four years (for a total of 444 observations), where t0 is the time of the BA 
investment. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the temporal and 
industry distribution of the sample deals and companies investigated in 
both papers. The number of firms investigated in this work is significantly 
lower than that of both the deals and the angel-backed firm considered in 
the first paper for several reasons. Firstly, the explicit unit of analysis of the 
first paper is constituted by the individual investments made by each BA, 
implying that the same company can be present in the investigated sample 
as many times as the BAs that have invested in it at the same time or in 
different years. Secondly, for a remarkable number of deals the responding 
angel did not indicate the name of the investee company or wrote in the 
questionnaire a name that could not be traced back to any real company, 
preventing the subsequent data collection required by the empirical 
 analysis to be run by Bonini et al. (2019). Finally, the need to observe 
angel-backed companies in a post-investment time horizon of at least 
three years did not allow the authors to use for the second paper the 2013 
and 2014 IBAN questionnaires, as at the time when the data collection 
process was carried out, the last official annual financial statement was 
that of 2015.
The performance of the funded ventures has been measured through 
the creation of an original indicator, the P.I. is an ordinal variable based on 
pre-selected combinations of accounting variables relating to revenues, net 
income and net asset value. The P.I. can assume five different ordinal 
scores:
(1) Revenues, net asset value and net income are positive → P.I. = 2
(2) Revenues and net asset value are positive,  
but net income is negative               → P.I. = 1
(3) Revenues are positive, but net asset value and  
net income are negative                → P.I. = 0
b3560_Ch02.indd   20 21-08-2019   17:55:01
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Table 2:  Sample descriptive statistics.
PANEL A — Temporal distribution
Paper#l: The determinants 
of BAs investment decisions 
No. of deals
Paper#2: The 
performance of 
angel-backed companies 
No. of firms
2008 95 2
2009 142 12
2010 137 27
2011 159 23
2012 162 47
2013 58
2014 57
Total 810 111
PANEL B — Industry distribution
Paper#l: The determinants 
of BAs investment decisions
Paper#2: The 
performance of 
angel-backed companies
Biotech 17.06% 17.12%
Cleantech 13.08% 13.51%
Commerce and 
distribution
10.09 % 9.01%
Electronics 9.34% 15.32%
Information and 
Communications 
Technology (ICT)
20.80% 18.02%
Media & 
Entertainment
9.96% 9.01%
Other sectors 19.68% 18.02%
Total 100.00% 100.00%
(4) Revenues are zero, net income is negative, but net asset  
value is positive  → P.I. = –1
(5) Revenues are zero, net income and net asset value  
are negative  → P.I. = –2
b3560_Ch02.indd   21 21-08-2019   17:55:01
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Table 3:  Dependent variables: descriptive statistics.
PANEL A — Dependent variable = Wealth%
Mean 15.48
Median 14
Maximum 60
Minimum 5
Standard deviation 11.8
No. of observation 669
PANEL B — Dependent variable = Participation%
Mean 14.74
Median 8
Maximum 100
Minimum 1
Standard deviation 19.54
No. of observation 808
PANEL C — Dependent variable = Performance Index
Ordinal Value Total by value
2 91
1 179
0 40
-1 54
-2 16
No. of firms without financial statement in t0 64
Total 444
In the 404 sample of company-years observations used in Bonini et al. 
(2019), 4.21% were in the lowest category of P.I., with negative income and 
net assets, and no revenues. 14.21% had only positive net assets, 10.53% 
only had positive revenues, 47.11% had both positive revenues and posi-
tive net assets and 23.95% also had positive net income.
Although many alternative combinations of outcomes are technically 
possible from a mere computational standpoint, the authors argue their 
five selected outcomes are consistent with the five performance scenarios 
b3560_Ch02.indd   22 21-08-2019   17:55:01
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commonly outlined in financial accounting literature (Anthony and 
Ramesh, 1992; Black, 1998; Fame and French, 2000; Nissim and Penman, 
2001; Omrani and Karami, 2010; Dickinson, 2011) and practice 
(Damodaran, 2015; Fabozzi et al., 2015).
The basic rationale underlying the P.I. is that it takes time for a small 
company receiving an equity injection to (i) fully deploy the projected oper-
ating investments disclosed in the fundraising process, (ii) adjust the business 
model and company operations, and (iii) start experiencing cash inflows, 
earnings and increase in the equity capital base. As a consequence, a common 
growth path to many angel-backed start-ups implies some years of zero or 
low revenues, negative profits and equity capital erosion, followed by either 
the increase of sales, earnings and cash flows, or the death of the company.
It’s therefore a crucial issue understanding the major contributions 
provided by BAs and leading some companies after a few years since their 
foundation to be able to be alive and grow their business, differently from 
some others experiencing low performance and undergoing liquidation or 
bankruptcy procedures within the same time frame.
3.  Main Research Hypotheses
The main research hypotheses set by the authors of both papers aim at 
investigating whether BAs’ investment decisions and the performance of 
angel-backed companies are affected by two main typologies of factors: the 
interaction across angel investors and the interaction between BAs and the 
funded venture.
As for the first factor, Bonini et al. (2018) measure the interaction 
across BAs through an original pair of variables related to the investment 
practices of the surveyed angels: the membership to a BAN and the num-
ber of BA co-investing in a given deal.
Also the second factor, i.e., the interaction between BAs and the angel-
backed company, is measured by two distinct variables, both based on the 
answers provided by the surveyed angels to specific questions about their 
investment decision-making process. The first measure discriminates 
between passive angel investors and actively involved ones, the formers 
being BAs investing just for financial purposes, the latters also providing 
relevant non-monetary contributions, such as mentoring, management 
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advisory, networking, sharing industry or product market knowledge 
related to their previous experience. The second measure is the intensity 
of the post-investment monitoring effort, that in the case of BAs, different 
from VCs, takes place basically through company visits and meeting with 
the funded entrepreneurs.
The main research hypotheses developed in the two works are 
 presented in the following section.
3.1.  Affiliation to an angel community
A significant transformation driver affecting the angel market in the last 
two decades is the emergence of angel investment organizations (Shane, 
2000; Josè et al., 2005; Aernoudt et al., 2007; Ibrahim, 2008; Paul and 
Whittam, 2010; Brush et al., 2012; Gregson et al., 2013; Lahti and 
Keinonen, 2016; Mason et al., 2016). It’s now well clear that by joining an 
angel syndicate BAs can enjoy multiple benefits, mostly due to the infor-
mation and knowledge sharing taking place inside the community. In 
particular, less experienced angels by getting in touch with more experi-
enced angels may have the opportunity to increase their human capital, 
developing a better understanding about how to implement effective 
value-creating investment decisions.
Therefore, Bonini et al. (2018) argue the affiliation to an angel syndi-
cate does have a double impact on BAs’ investment decision. Firstly, due to 
the information sharing and screening contribution provided by angel 
investment organizations, which decreases the opaqueness as well as the 
perceived risk profile of BAs’ typical investment opportunities, affiliate 
members should invest in companies belonging to this peculiar asset class 
more of their personal wealth than unaffiliated angels.
Secondly, BAs joining a BAN benefit from the deal flow disclosed 
inside the angel community and, therefore, are provided with both a 
higher number of and better quality investment opportunities compared 
to non-BAN members. However, given that the impact of angel syndicates 
on BA investments should not necessarily result in structural changes in 
either angels’ risk aversion or angels’ historical asset allocation strategies, 
affiliated angels offset the increase in the number and the unit size of deals 
with a decrease in the equity stake acquired in the investee companies.
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In support of such hypothesis, Table 4 shows that the Italian angels 
joining an angel syndicate have in their asset portfolio a number of angel 
deals higher than that of the unaffiliated angels: Only 18% of BAs who are 
not members of any given BAN own a portfolio with more than five 
investments, against about 47% of those angel investors affiliated with 
a BAN.
Finally, assuming the standpoint of the angel-backed companies, 
Bonini et al. (2019) observe many BANs arrange on a regular basis courses 
and training programs targeted to both their own affiliates or potential 
entrepreneurs, in order to increase the quality of the entrepreneur– 
investor relationship and maximize the post investment value contribu-
tion provided by BAs.
Additionally, BAN membership gives affiliated angels the opportunity 
to enjoy some common services, such as due diligence and contract 
designing, as well as to optimize BAs’ decision-making styles according to 
their investment behavior in a trust-based environment, ultimately increas-
ing the probability of the funded venture to run follow-on investment 
rounds (Wiltbank, 2009; Fili et al., 2013; Bonnet et al., 2013; Bammens and 
Collewaert, 2014). It is therefore possible that the contribution of angel 
syndicates is not limited to the generation and screening of investment 
opportunities, rather positively impacting the growth path and the value 
creation potential of the angel-backed companies.
The causal relationships above argued have been tested through 
the use of the dummy variable BAN-membership, that assumes the value 
of  one if at least one BA joining a given deal shows a BAN affiliation. 
Table 4:  Business angels’ investment intensity.
No. of deals in business 
angles’ portfolios
Whole sample 
(%)
BAN members 
(%)
Non-BAN members 
(%)
>10 17.9 18.16 9.13
6–10 26.05 28.32 9.14
2–5 33.46 35.16 51.34
1 22.59 18.26 20.38
χ2 (portfolio > 5) 32.02***
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The  expected relationships between the dummy BAN-membership and 
the  dependent variables investigated in the two papers are depicted in 
Figure 1.
3.2.  The co-investment across BAs
Alongside with angel investment organizations, another rising phenome-
non affecting the informal venture capital market is the emergence of the 
practice of co-investment, that can be pursued according to more or less 
structured modes, involving a plurality of investments or just a single deal 
raising the interests of multiple BAs forming an investment syndicate (or 
“club deal”) on a spot basis.
From the IBAN data on the Italian market, a rather heterogeneous 
scenario emerges, where the number of co-investors varies from a maxi-
mum of 15 to a minimum of 0, assumes an average value of 4 and a median 
value of 2, confirming co-investment as a structural investment practice 
within the angel market.
The co-investment yields some valuable advantages to BAs. First, it 
allows them to reduce their individual equity stake in the investee compa-
nies, without sacrificing the opportunity to play an active role and eventu-
ally provide value-added contributions, due to the cumulative equity 
position held by all the BAs co-investing in a given deal, that is higher than 
“solo” angels’ equity stake (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Second, consistent 
with modern portfolio theory (Elton and Gruber, 2005), the co-investment 
option is a pure rational diversification strategy aimed at reducing the risk 
from a given investment opportunity and, therefore, at relying on more 
diversified investment portfolios (Harrison and Mason, 2002; Mason et al., 
2013). Third, similar to an analogous argument developed about angel 
has a positive impact on the share of personal wealth each 
angel invests in a given deal (Wealth%). 
Affiliation to a BAN has a negative impact on the angel’s share of equity stake of 
the funded venture (Participation%).
has a positive impact on the performance of angel-backed 
firms (Performance-Index).
Figure 1:  Hypothesized effects of the affiliation to an angel community.
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syndicates, BAs, by co-investing in a given deal, can get access to risk-
reducing information coming from the reciprocal knowledge, background 
and previous experience (Aernoudt, 2005; Sohl, 2012).
As a consequence of the above said, Bonini et al. (2018) assume ratio-
nal BAs deciding to co-invest are likely to adopt a risk-sharing perspective 
also when deciding the amount of their personal wealth to allocate to a 
given deal, therefore individually investing a smaller amount of capital 
than “solo” angels.
When assuming the perspective of the investee ventures, Bonini et al. 
(2019) argue a company being funded by a syndicate of angels might enjoy 
a wider set of both monetary and non-monetary contributions than that 
possibly provided by a solo angel, thus increasing its growth potential as well 
as its future probability of survival. As for the monetary contributions, it’s 
clear a high number of co-investing angels implies the opportunity to imme-
diately start the business with a higher size scale, market potential and an 
increased probability to run follow-on investment rounds over time. A fur-
ther monetary contribution for the angel-backed companies comes from the 
possibility to benefit from the sharing taking place across co-investing angels 
of the costs of due diligence, contracting and monitoring. As for the non-
monetary contributions, the angel-backed companies can enjoy multiple 
sources of coaching and mentoring and can benefit from each BA’s industrial 
knowledge, previous investment experience and relationship network.
The magnitude of the co-investment, as measured by the number of 
co-investors in a given deal, therefore implies a higher quality selection 
process and a more effective post-investment involvement than those of 
the “solo” angels, because of the possibility to benefit from wider experi-
ence, knowledge and social capital.
Such research hypothesis has been tested through the variable 
Co-investors, which corresponds to the number of BAs joining a given 
deal. The expected relationships between the variable Co-investors and the 
dependent variables selected in the two papers are described in Figure 2.
3.3.  Active or passive investors?
As anticipated in the previous section, the contribution BAs can provide 
in a given deal is often not limited to just the subscription of equity capital, 
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but, as pointed out by the literature, it might be aimed at seeking active 
involvement with their portfolio companies, supporting them in the value 
creation process through a hands-on approach. The willingness to share 
with the entrepreneur own industry skills, to offer mentoring and advisory 
services, to participate in the strategic design process, to optimize corpo-
rate governance, to provide previous experience, to make the funded ven-
ture benefit from their own network of industry and financial relationships 
are all examples of non-monetary contributions possibly available to angel-
backed companies (Mason and Harrison, 2000; Mason, 2006; Politis, 2008; 
Landström and Mason, 2016; Croce et al., 2018).
On the contrary, it is not uncommon to observe BAs not willing and/
or able to play such an active role in the funded ventures: rather, they 
behave according to a hands-off approach typical of purely financial inves-
tors, being attracted by potential capital gains and by the portfolio diversi-
fication benefits associated to angel investments.
Hence, Bonini et al. (2018) assume that “active” and “passive” investors 
exhibit a structurally different investment pattern. More in detail, the 
exclusive orientation to financial yields and diversification benefits is 
likely to have a negative impact on both the share of BAs’ personal 
resources to be invested and the size of their equity stakes in the funded 
ventures.
Such hypothesis has been tested through the dummy variable Passive 
investor, that takes a value of one if the responding angel states that the 
investment decision was driven exclusively by capital gain motivation and 
not by other reasons suggesting his willingness to play an active role in the 
angel-backed company.
The expected relationships between the dummy Passive investor and 
the variables Wealth% and (Participation%) are represented in Figure 3.
has a negative impact on the share of personal wealth each 
angel invests in a given deal (Wealth%). 
Co-investment has a negative impact on the angel’s share of equity stake of 
the funded venture (Participation%). 
has a positive impact on the performance of angel-backed 
firms (Performance-Index). 
Figure 2:  Hypothesized effects of the co-investment in a given deal.
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Differently from controversial findings from the venture capital 
 industry, the impact of BAs’ active involvement on portfolio companies is 
generally found to be positive as for the possibility of angel-backed 
 companies to both raise follow-on funds and create value for their stock-
holders (Madill et al., 2005; Chua and Wu, 2012; Landström and Mason, 
2016). In line with these evidences, Bonini et al. (2019) hypothesize a posi-
tive relationship between the Performance Index of the funded ventures 
and BAs’ active involvement in company operations (Figure 4).
3.4.  The intensity of monitoring
Finance literature has deeply addressed the role of the monitoring as a way 
to reduce the problems related to information asymmetry and moral haz-
ard stemming from any type of securities investments (Jensen and 
Mecking, 1976; Diamond, 1984; Aghion and Bolton, 1992).
As far as VC and private equity investments are concerned, a wide 
stream of studies has extensively investigated how institutional investors 
monitor target companies and the major contingent contracts, clauses 
and  mechanisms used to manage such problems and realign incentives 
between investors and company owner-managers (Sahlman, 1990; 
Triantis, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; 
Chemmanur et al., 2011; Cumming, 2008; Wong et al., 2009; Metrick and 
Yasuda, 2010; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Bernstein et al., 2016; Erenburg 
et al., 2016).
has a negative impact on the share of personal wealth each 
angel invests in a given deal (Wealth%). 
Passive investment 
has a negative impact on the angel’s share of equity stake of 
the funded venture (Participation%). 
Figure 3:  Hypothesized effects of the BAs’ “passive” investment behavior.
Active involvement has a positive impact on the performance of 
angel-backed firms (Performance-Index).
Figure 4:  Hypothesized effects of the BAs’ “active” involvement.
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In the case of angel financing, however, several contributions point out 
that BAs hardly adopt the typical monitoring mechanisms used by venture 
capitalist, preferring instead to implement “non-aggressive” and informal 
control mechanisms which Bonini et al. (2018, 2019) define as “soft moni-
toring” ones, such as geographical proximity to the angel-backed com-
pany, BAs’ knowledge of the industry, experience gained from previous 
investments and, most importantly, interactions with entrepreneurs 
through periodic meeting or company visits (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Kelly 
and Hay, 2003; Wiltbank and Boecker, 2007; Ibrahim, 2008; Chemmanur 
and Chen, 2014; Goldfarb et al., 2014; Bonini and Capizzi, 2017).
It is then reasonable to assume the more intense the soft monitoring 
effort put by BAs, the lower the investment risk perception by BAs in their 
investment decision-making process, hence positively impacting on both the 
amount invested and the size of their equity stakes in the funded ventures.
However, when considering the perspective of the angel-backed com-
panies, one has to remind the tight fiduciary relationship existing between 
the BA and the entrepreneur, mutually nurtured by reciprocal trust (Chua 
and Wu, 2012; Bammens and Collewaert, 2014). Therefore, it might be the 
case that tightening the degree of soft monitoring could harm the trust-
based relationship between the entrepreneur and the angel investor, nega-
tively impacting on the mutual perception on each other’s contribution, 
possibly worsening the future company performance.
The above-developed research hypothesis has been investigated 
using the variable Soft-monitoring, that may take a value from 1 to 5, 
depending on the frequency of the visits a BA makes to its portfolio com-
panies. The expected relationships between the variable Soft-monitoring 
and the dependent variables being studied in the two papers are shown in 
Figure 5.
has a positive impact on the share of personal wealth each
angel invests in a given deal (Wealth%). 
The intensity of Soft-monitoring has a positive impact on the angel’s share of equity stake of
the funded venture (Partecipation%).
has a negative impact on the performance of angel-backed
firms (Performance-Index). 
Figure 5:  The intensity of the Soft-monitoring.
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4.  Methodology and Main Results
In the first paper, the authors investigate the determinants of BAs’ invest-
ment decisions by running an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
model between the two selected dependent variables (Wealth% and 
Participation%) and a set of independent variables related to the research 
hypotheses developed in the previous sections: BAN membership, 
Co-investors, Passive investor and Soft-monitoring.
In addition to the four independent variables defined above, the 
model also introduces control variables related to the characteristics of the 
BAs (age, education, wealth, previous investment experience, professional 
background), the characteristics of the funded ventures (company size, age 
and stage in the life cycle, geographical location) and to the characteristics 
of the reference industry (industry price-to-book value ratio and industry 
capital intensity). Finally, the authors add to some model specifications 
time and industry-fixed effects to account for possible heterogeneity in 
BAs’ behavior.
The analysis is then replied for the sub-samples of affiliated and 
 unaffiliated BAs separately, in order to be able to identify structural differ-
ences in BAs’ investment practices likely driven by the different degree of 
networking, information and knowledge sharing across the two groups.
In the second paper, being the dependent variable the five-stage 
 ordinal variable Performance Index, the authors run a set of ordinal logistic 
(Ologit) regression analysis.
The explanatory variables are related to the main research hypotheses: 
BAN_membership, Co-investors, Active-Involvement, Soft-Monitoring. 
Moreover, the authors included firm-specific controls (company age, size, 
location and stage in the life cycle) and angel-specific controls (BA’s age, 
experience and equity stake in the funded venture), together with fixed 
temporal and industry effects.
The results, reported in Table 5, show that being a member of an angel 
community increases the share of wealth invested in a deal by approxi-
mately 16% (column 2) and reduces the size of the equity stake in the 
investee venture by approximately 14% (column 5), thus confirming the 
authors’ hypotheses about the role of angel syndicates on BAs’ investment 
decisions.
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Table 5:  Huber–White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient.
Y = Wealth% Y = Participation%
Independent variables
Whole  
sample
BAN  
Member
Non-BAN 
Member
Whole  
sample
BAN  
Member
Non-BAN 
Member Whole sample
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BAN_membership 0.155*** -0.139* 0.225
(0.05) (0.07) (0.37)
Co-investors
-0.017*** -0.035*** -0.007 -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.069*** 0.063**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Passive Investor -0.064 -0.023 -0.163** -0.186** -0.262** -0.264***
(1.08) (0.25) (2.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09)
Active Involvement 0,479
(0.31)
Soft-Monitoring 0.054* -0.053 0.154*** 0.214*** 0.116** 0.287*** -0.316***
(1.92) (1.62) (4.60) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12)
ANGEL F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FIRM F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
cut 1
-7.129***
cut 2
-5.354***
cut 3 -4.874***
cut 4 -2.235*
R2 0.27 0.35 0.37 0.56 0.51 0.67 0.10
Observations 569 292 277 569 292 277 303
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%.
Y = Performance-Index
b3560_Ch02.indd   32
21-08-2019   17:55:04
 
N
e
w
 
F
r
o
n
t
i
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
E
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
i
a
l
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
w
w
w
.
w
o
r
l
d
s
c
i
e
n
t
i
f
i
c
.
c
o
m
b
y
 
9
3
.
4
7
.
1
8
7
.
2
 
o
n
 
1
1
/
0
6
/
1
9
.
 
R
e
-
u
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
y
 
n
o
t
 
p
e
r
m
i
t
t
e
d
,
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
f
o
r
 
O
p
e
n
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
.
b3560 New Frontiers in Entrepreneurial Finance Research6”x 9” 
The Role of Angel Syndicates on the Demand and Supply of Informal Venture Capital 33
However, the affiliation to an angel network does not seem to have 
a statistically significant impact on the performance of angel-backed com-
panies (column 8), maybe due to the intrinsic features of the authors’ 
survey-based dataset, which does not allow the possibility to account for 
the qualitative differences in the various forms of potentially existing angel 
investment organizations.
Ceteris paribus, a one-unit increase in the number of co-investors 
reduces the percentage of BA’s personal wealth invested in a single deal by 
2% (column 2) and decreases the individual participation in the investee 
company by an economically significant 7%; therefore, co-investing 
appears to be an effective way to pursue risk-minimizing investment deci-
sions while enjoying the upside of portfolio diversification.
Moreover, by comparing affiliated angels to unaffiliated angels, 
Bonini et al. (2018) observe the BAs’ wealth allocation is affected by the 
presence of co-investors only for the sub-sample of the BAs affiliated 
to an angel community, implying that there could be a positive effect 
played by the trust established within a given angel community. On the 
opposite, the absence of an effect for unaffiliated angels might be inter-
preted as the result of a lack of knowledge of other investors’ profiles 
and characteristics, eventually preventing BAs from co-investing 
because of potential free-riding and/or opportunistic behavior 
 (columns 3 and 4).
As for the variable Participation%, results confirm the expected nega-
tive relationship between the number of co-investors and the equity stake 
in the investee company for both sub-samples (columns 6 and 7), though 
showing higher significance for affiliated angels. The phenomenon of 
 co-investment also positively affects the performance of angel-backed 
companies, as expected (column 8).
When considering BAs’ motivations to invest, it is confirmed the 
existence of a negative relationship between a “passive” investment apti-
tude and BAs’ investment decisions, though limited to just unaffiliated 
angels. Bonini et al. (2018) argue that within an angel community the 
possibility of benefitting from co-investing with other affiliated angels, 
the possibility of enjoying other angels’ experience and knowledge may 
provide incentives that ultimately positively affect the percentage 
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wealth invested by passive BAs, similarly to actively involved BAs’ 
investment decisions.
Finally, the variable soft-monitoring, is significant and has a positive 
impact on both the dependent variables Wealth%, (column 2) and 
Participation% (column 5), confirming the authors’ hypothesis. By look-
ing at the results of the analysis run separately for affiliated and unaffili-
ated BAs, it turns out that the impact of BAs’ monitoring is statistically 
significant only for investors not joining an angel community, thus con-
firming the quality of the contribution in terms of deal flow and screen-
ing provided by angel groups to their members. In fact, it is likely that 
affiliated angels put a higher effort in monitoring only on ventures per-
ceived as riskier and, thus, more opaque. When considering the impact 
of soft monitoring on the performance of angel-backed companies, the 
results of the empirical analysis show a statistically significant negative 
relationship, supporting the argument that tightening the control on the 
funded venture might damage the underlying trust-based fiduciary rela-
tionship and eventually worsen the future probability of survival and 
growth.
In Bonini et al. (2018), the authors provided further support to their 
results by performing multiple robustness checks (including a set of two-
stage instrumental variable regressions and propensity score matching 
regressions) to face possible sample bias or endogeneity issues dealing 
with the decision to join a given angel investment organization. Results, 
not reported in this chapter, are qualitatively unchanged.
In Bonini et al. (2019), on top of the various robustness checks per-
formed, the authors tested the predictive power of their P.I. by creating a 
dummy variable (Survival) assuming the value one for those ventures that 
have survived four years after the initial investment, or zero otherwise. They 
then run a set of logistic regressions on such variable against the P.I. as 
explanatory variable on both the sample of angel-backed companies and a 
homogeneous sample of control companies not funded by BAs. Table 6 
shows the results of this regression analysis, which confirms the predictive 
power on the survival of angel-backed firms of the P.I. for both samples, dif-
ferently from other traditional accounting measures (total assets and 
revenues).
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5.  Conclusions
The recent explosion of the informal venture capital market all over the 
world is stimulating finance scholars to deeply investigate the major deter-
minants, characteristics and possible implications of this phenomenon 
within the start-up ecosystems. Though now rather developed and well 
differentiated by major research themes, literature on BAs still misses to 
adequately cover many actual investigation areas where, up to date, the 
knowledge is still limited. Examples of relatively low explored topics deal 
with the operations and the role played by the different typologies of BA 
networks or, also, the valuation of the contributions provided by BAs to 
the survival and growth of the angel-backed companies.
Table 6:  Predictive power of different performance measures.
(1) (2) (3)
Angel-
backed 
firms
Control 
sample
Angel-
backed 
firms
Control 
sample
Angel-
backed 
firms
Control 
sample
Performance-Index 0.623**
(0.29)
0.359*
(0.191)
Total Assets -0.163
(0.18)
0.038
0.141
Revenues 0.081
(0.06)
0.032
0.043
Industry-FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Intercept 0.759
(0.53)
0.682**
(0.341)
3.497
(2.48)
0.557
(1.764)
0.49
(0.76)
0.728
(0.495)
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.06 0.131 0.03 0.119 0.04
N 80 114 80 114 80 114
Notes: In this table are presented results for a set of logistic regressions estimating the survival of firms 
through the Performance Index and two other traditional measures of performance. The dependent 
variable is a dummy (“Survival”) assuming value one for those firms that have survived four-years after 
the initial investment, or zero otherwise. Huber–White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
are reported in parentheses under each coefficient. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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The contributions of Bonini et al. (2018, 2019) are part of the ongoing 
debate on these two research areas that have not yet been exhaustively 
explored. The two papers show that the affiliation to an angel community 
does affect BAs’ investment decisions, though it doesn’t seem to have a 
significant impact on the survival and profitability of the funded ventures, 
except for the weakest performing ones. On the contrary, by co-investing 
on a deal-specific basis in a given angel syndicate, BAs may enjoy risk-
sharing and information-sharing benefits that structurally affect both 
their investment practices and the performance of the funded ventures.
Also the BAs’ willingness to play an active role by providing value-
added contributions in terms of industry skill, experience, mentoring and 
networking opportunities plays a major role in driving the angel-backed 
companies to survival and growth.
On the contrary, the intensity of BAs’ soft monitoring seems nega-
tively related to the performance of the funded ventures because of the 
impact on the trust-based entrepreneur–angel relationship. However, 
angel communities might be able to decrease and distribute within the 
network the need for individual monitoring while increasing members’ 
confidence in the angel investments.
Future research will have to shed more light on the pivotal role played 
by angel syndicates — both inside and outside angel communities — 
within the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem, given their intrinsic poten-
tial as mechanisms for sharing across BAs information, experience and 
knowledge. Another promising area of future research stems from the 
extension of the analysis at an international level through worldwide-
based BA samples, in order to find out best practices inside angel invest-
ment organizations as well as focused public policies aimed at creating 
favorable environments for angel investors.
One concrete example of one possible policy measure could be the 
design of dedicated financing facility schemes leveraging on the value-
adding potential of BAs, such as the creation of public–private angel 
 co-investment funds.
Finally, the analyzed contributions suggest a number of possible 
action schemes also for BAs, on the one hand, and entrepreneurs, on the 
other hand. As a matter of fact, the business model of “solo angels” looks 
like less effective and value-adding than that of BAs deciding to co-invest 
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and, therefore, to enjoy the many benefits associated to an angel syndicate, 
ultimately positively impacting the investment risk and the performance 
of the funded venture. From the entrepreneurs’ side, it is crucial to con-
sider the major contribution provided by angel investors is not just a pure 
monetary one: therefore, involving as equity investors a pool of co-inves-
tors is a unique opportunity to exploit multiple background experiences, 
know how, industry and product market knowledge, networks of personal 
relationships as well as the standing and reputation of all the angels co-
investing in a given deal.
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